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18 June 1963

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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### DAILY BRIEF

\*Italy: (Premier-designate Aldo Moro's failure to win support of the Nenni Socialists reduces the chances that a stable Italian government can be formed before President Kennedy's visit to Italy.)

(President Segni, according to Moro, insists a new government must be formed in time for the President's visit. Because of this pressure, Moro is thinking in terms of a stop-gap arrangement pending new elections, perhaps in September. He believes that only an "administrative" cabinet could possibly be put together in the two weeks remaining before the President's scheduled arrival. He feels that with more time the Democratic Socialists and the Republicans could be induced to return to collaboration with the conservative Liberal Party in another Christian-Democratic-led coalition. Even if there were time to attempt such a reconciliation, however, Moro would not undertake to form a cabinet himself.)

(In any event, the outlook will probably remain clouded until the Socialist Party's congress, scheduled for 18-21 July, makes a formal decision on its attitude toward the Christian Democrats.)

South Vietnam: (It is not yet clear whether the agreement reached between the Buddhists and the Diem government will result in any immediate alleviation of the situation.)

(Following the rioting in Saigon on 16 June, a Buddhist leader indicated that the Buddhists intended to adhere to the agreement but remained skeptical that the government would do so.)

(The agreement covers all five demands raised by the Buddhists and represents a compromise by both sides. It apparently provides definite arrangements under which Buddhists can display their flags and hold their religious ceremonies. Settlement of the three remaining demands--legal status for Buddhist associations, release of Buddhists under detention, and investigation of responsibility for the 8 May incidents in Hue--depends, however, on the government's taking additional steps to carry out its promises.)

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Communist China - Laos: Peiping's latest editorial on Laos appears intended to demonstrate for other Communist parties the contrast between Chinese support for militancy and Soviet caution.

In the People's Daily editorial of 16 June, the Chinese, in the context of discussing the role of the co-chairmen of the ICC, attacked the Russians implicitly for failing to use their ICC position to denounce the US. Ignoring repeated Soviet public complaints of US "interference" in Laos, Peiping charges that the US and the West are violating the Geneva agreements while Moscow looks on in silence.

Noting sarcastically that the US had appealed to "somebody" to "soften the Laotian people" and bring pressure on Peiping, the Chinese virtually imply that Moscow is secretly in league with Washington.

While the Chinese encourage continued revolutionary activity and warn that they will not "look on idly while others violate the Geneva agreements... and threaten China's security"--the toughest language they have used in many months--they carefully avoided a commitment to action.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Turkey: (Significant military elements remain dissatisfied with the performance of Prime Minister Inonu's government.)

(Strongly worded antigovernment leaflets signed by a "National Revolutionary Army" (MDO) are said to have been distributed and posted on buildings in several cities last week. The MDO is reported to have been founded sometime last year, and is alleged to include many influential military and civilian leaders as well as a number of younger officers.)

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[redacted] the MDO favored a moderate military dictatorship--to bring about social equality and democracy--and a nonaligned foreign policy.)

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(Sentiment against the government is reported to be particularly strong in the Third Army located in eastern Turkey. The government has appeared reluctant to investigate dissidence in the Third Army or arrest persons known to sympathize with former Colonel Aydemir's coup attempt last month. [redacted])

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NOTE

South Vietnam: The Viet Cong have significantly improved their antiaircraft capability against helicopters and other low-speed aircraft. During the first four months of this year, US and South Vietnamese aircraft were hit almost three times as often by ground fire as in the previous four-month period. A captured Viet Cong document indicates that an extensive training program in antiaircraft firing procedures was begun last year. [REDACTED]

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Editor's Note: The first sentence of the second paragraph of the brief titled "USSR-Satellites," which was published on page 4 of the Central Intelligence Bulletin for 17 June 1963, should read as follows:

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Khrushchev stated that popular demand in the satellites for an improved standard of living must be accommodated to some extent. [REDACTED]

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The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

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The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

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